The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Anthropic Principle Objection

Not ten years ago, physicist Paul Davies claimed, “There is now broad agreement among physicists and cosmologists that the universe is in several respects ‘fine-tuned’ for life.”[1] If the universe were just slightly different in one of many respects – if, for instance, the mass of the neutron were increased by 1/700 its actual mass – then life would almost certainly not exist.[2] Consequently, that the universe is capable of supporting life has led some to believe that the universe was “fine-tuned”: specifically designed or created for the purpose of supporting life, in particular human life. According to proponents of this line of thinking, the odds that the universe just happened to be capable of supporting life – the odds that the universe would be capable of supporting life without having been fine-tuned to do so – are so minuscule that we ought to believe that the universe was fine-tuned by God, and thus that God exists. In Alvin Plantinga’s words,

It’s as if there are a large number of dials that have to be tuned to within extremely narrow limits for life to be possible in our universe. It is extremely unlikely that this should happen by chance, but much more likely that this should happen if there is such a person as God.[3]

Following Robin Collins, we can formulate this fine-tuning argument for the existence of God more explicitly as follows:

1.     The existence of apparent fine-tuning is not improbable under theism. (Premise)

2.     The existence of apparent fine-tuning is very improbable under atheism. (Premise)

3.     The existence of apparent fine-tuning provides strong evidence in favor of theism over atheism. (1, 2, prime principle of confirmation)[4]

 (3) follows from (1), (2), and the prime principle of confirmation, which states that an observation counts as evidence in favor of one hypothesis over another if it has a higher probability under that hypothesis.[5]

Like any philosophical argument, the fine-tuning argument has its detractors. In this essay, I will consider the merits of a key objection raised by opponents of the fine-tuning argument – what Collins calls the anthropic principle objection – and argue that this objection does not mitigate against the argument.[6]

Before we address the anthropic principle objection directly, it is helpful to reflect on what exactly the fine-tuning argument is designed (as it were) to achieve. As Collins notes, the argument itself does not purport to prove theism; it only purports to provide strong evidence in favor of theism, all else being equal. Just how strong that evidence is can be determined by using Bayes’ Theorem, which allows us to calculate how the epistemic probability of a hypothesis (in this case, the theistic hypothesis) is affected by specific evidence (in this case, apparent fine-tuning). Let us, then, “plug in” the fine-tuning argument to Bayes’ Theorem.

Suppose that P(T), the prior probability of theism (i.e., the probability of theism without taking apparent fine-tuning into consideration), is 0.5. (As a result, of course, P(~T), the prior probability of atheism, is also 0.5.) Suppose further that P(F|T), the probability of apparent fine-tuning under theism (i.e., the probability that the universe is apparently fine-tuned if God exists), is 0.5, and that P(F|~T), the probability of apparent fine-tuning under atheism (i.e., the probability that the universe is apparently fine-tuned if God does not exist), is 0.1. Then, according to Bayes’ Theorem, P(T|F), the posterior probability of theism (i.e., the probability of theism after apparent fine-tuning has been taken into consideration), is [P(T) x P(F|T)]/[P(T) x P(F|T) + P(~T) x P(F|~T)] = [(0.5)(0.5)]/(0.5 x 0.5 + 0.5 x 0.1) = 0.25/0.3 ≈ 0.83, or 83%. Therefore, if our values for P(T), P(F|T), and P(F|~T) are correct, then the existence of apparent fine-tuning increases the probability of theism substantially, by approximately 33%.

This claim, in essence, is the claim of the fine-tuning argument. In Bayesian terms, the fine-tuning argument states that the values of P(F|T) and P(F|~T) are such that P(T|F) is significantly higher than P(T): If P(F|T) is much higher than P(F|~T), then P(T|F) will be markedly higher than P(T), and apparent fine-tuning will serve as strong evidence for theism.

Recasting the fine-tuning argument in these Bayesian terms is useful because it makes clear how one ought to go about responding to the fine-tuning argument: namely, by ascertaining the relative values of P(F|T) and P(F|~T). If one can demonstrate that P(F|~T) is not appreciably lower than P(F|T), then the fine-tuning argument loses its force. (Presumably, one could also respond to the argument by questioning the applicability of Bayes’ Theorem to the argument, but the use of that theorem in this case has not been a main point of contention.) In addition, the Bayesian formulation of the argument makes clear how one ought not to go about responding to the argument. In particular, any response to the fine-tuning argument that does not consider the relative values of P(F|T) and P(F|~T) misses the point.

Unfortunately, some responses to the fine-tuning argument either do not focus on these values or confuse them with other values. Most notable of these inadequate responses is the aforementioned anthropic principle objection:

According to the weak version of [the] so-called anthropic principle, if the laws of nature were not fine-tuned, we would not be here to comment on the fact. Some have argued, therefore, that the fine-tuning is not really improbable or surprising at all under atheism, but simply follows from the fact that we exist.[7]

The objection’s underlying intuition is simple: If the universe were not apparently fine-tuned, then life would not exist, and we would not be able to observe any apparent fine-tuning. But we are able to observe apparent fine-tuning; our ability to do so follows from our existence as living things. Why, then, should we be surprised at the existence of apparent fine-tuning in our universe?

This intuition can be restated in terms of the relationship between two values: P(L), the probability that life exists in the universe, and P(F), the probability that the universe is apparently fine-tuned. Roughly speaking, the intuition seems to be that P(L) = P(F). If P(L) were 0 – that is, if life did not exist in the universe – then P(F) would also be 0. (After all, if life did not exist in the universe, then we would have no evidence to support the claim that the universe was apparently fine-tuned for life!) On the other hand, if P(L) is 1 – if life does exist in the universe – then P(F) is also 1, because apparent fine-tuning is necessary for life to exist.

The problem, of course, is that neither P(L) nor P(F) factors into the Bayesian formulation of the fine-tuning argument. That P(L) and P(F) both equal 1 says nothing in and of itself about the values of P(F|T) and P(F|~T). As far as I can tell, then, those who employ the anthropic principle objection have erred simply by confusing P(F) with P(F|~T): They have attempted to refute the fine-tuning argument by demonstrating that P(F) is very high (which, though true, does nothing to undermine the argument) instead of demonstrating that P(F|~T) is very high (which would undermine the argument). The important thing to realize, though, is that P(F) is largely irrelevant to the fine-tuning argument. Even if P(F) equals 1, P(F|~T) can still be very low – and if P(F|~T) is very low (and lower than P(F|T)), then the fine-tuning argument retains its thrust.

To understand how P(F|~T) can be very low even if P(F) is 1, and to understand the confusion behind the anthropic principle objection, Collins provides a firing squad analogy.[8] Suppose that I am a prisoner scheduled to be executed by a firing squad of fifty expert marksmen; when the time comes for me to be executed, however, all fifty marksmen miss me. What should I conclude from the fact that all fifty marksmen missed me? As Collins notes, it would be extremely odd for me to say, “Of course I survived! If I hadn’t survived, I wouldn’t be alive to observe my survival!” On the contrary, I would probably react to my survival by concluding that the marksmen were (for whatever reason) trying to miss me.

Why is the latter reaction by far the more natural and reasonable reaction? We can answer that question by analyzing my thought process in terms of specific probabilities. Assume that I believed before my failed execution that there was a 10% chance that the marksmen would intentionally try miss me. If the marksmen were in fact trying to miss me, then there was a 99.9% chance that they would miss me – but if the marksmen were not trying to miss me, then there was only a 0.1% chance that they would miss me. Thus, P(I), the probability that they would intentionally try to miss me, is 0.1; P(M|I), the probability that they would miss me if they intentionally tried to miss me, is 0.999; and P(M|~I), the probability that they would miss me if they did not intentionally try to miss me, is 0.001. From these three pieces of information, we can again use Bayes’ Theorem to conclude that P(I|M), the probability that the marksmen intentionally tried to miss me in light of the fact that they did actually miss me, is  [P(I) x P(M|I)]/[P(I) x P(M|I) + P(~I) x P(M|~I)], or approximately 99.1%.

Notoriously absent from these considerations is P(M), the probability that the marksmen actually missed me. Obviously, P(M) = 1: They did, in fact, miss me. Nonetheless, the fact that they missed me does not entail that they had to miss me – remember, the men in question are marksmen – nor does it entail that they were not intentionally trying to miss me. Consequently, to determine whether or not they were intentionally trying to miss me, we must consider P(I), P(M|I), and P(M|~I) – not P(M).

What is the point of this analogy? Just as P(M|~I) can be quite low even if P(M) = 1, P(F|~T) can be quite low even if P(F) = 1. Just as the fact that the marksmen missed me does not entail that they had to miss me or that they were not intentionally trying to miss me, the fact that life exists in the universe does not entail that life had to exist in the universe or that God did not fine-tune the universe. Just as P(I|M) does not at all depend on P(M), P(T|F) does not at all depend on P(F). Returning to the original objection therefore, the proponent of the fine-tuning argument can say the following:

I do not dispute the weak version of the anthropic principle: If the universe were not apparently fine-tuned, then we would not exist to discuss fine-tuning. But we should still be surprised by the fact that there is apparent fine-tuning in the universe, because we should still be surprised by the fact that we exist. Granted, we couldn’t possibly observe any possible universe in which there was no apparent fine-tuning and in which life did not exist. However, those other universes, unobservable though they would be, still could have existed – and since they all could have existed, our existence and the apparent fine-tuning of our universe are still both much more improbable under atheism than under theism.

If that thinking is correct, then the anthropic principle objection poses no threat to the fine-tuning argument.

Obviously, in spite of the shortcomings of the anthropic principle objection, other objections to the fine-tuning argument remain. Although Collins lists four kinds of fine-tuning that suggest that P(F|~T) is quite low – the fine-tuning of the laws of physics, the fine-tuning of the constants of physics, the fine-tuning of the initial conditions of the universe, and the fine-tuning of certain higher-level features of the universe – other physicists, such as Victor Stenger, have challenged the low value assigned to P(F|~T) by proponents of the fine-tuning argument.[9]^,[10] Of course, as a non-scientist, I am not well equipped to adjudicate disputes over the precise value of P(F|~T). (That being said, I do find it telling that even Stephen Hawking, a committed skeptic, agrees that “the values of [the dimensionless fundamental physical constants] seem to have been very finely adjusted to make possible the development of life,” implying that life would not exist in the vast majority of possible universes.)[11] Nevertheless, the anthropic principle objection itself, insofar as it fails to take P(F|~T) into direct consideration, does not mitigate against the fine-tuning argument.

---

[1] P. Davies, “How bio-friendly is the universe?”

[2] J. Leslie, Universes

[3] A. Plantinga, “The Dawkins Confusion; Naturalism ad absurdum”

[4] R. Collins, “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning.” For the sake of simplicity, Collins’ original argument has been modified slightly.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] V. Stenger, “The Anthropic Principle”

[11] S. Hawking, A Brief History of Time

Fish Tank Post: Magic

Here it is.

Fish Tank Post: By Any Other Name?

Here it is.

Fish Tank Post: Secular Reductionism

Here it is.

Fish Tank Post: What Is Science?

Here it is.

Fish Tank Post: Science of the Gaps

Here it is.

Global Cooling?

So it seems like every year (at least for 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009), there's been someone talking about global cooling. Based on the most recent climate change data, it appears that the world may actually be cooling (or, for the sake of being cautious, it appears that the world cooled in 2008).

So I know I shouldn't be, but I'm confused about how this mounting pile evidence was somehow trampled by the global warming bandwagon. Can they take back Al Gore's Nobel Peace Prize now? Please? It'd be a shame if it was awarded for nothing.

Denis Lamoureux's Book and Genesis 1-11

I'm planning on reading Dr. Denis O. Lamoureux's Evolutionary Creation: A Christian Approach to Evolution. I'm extremely excited, because Dr. Lamoureux (who is at the conference I am at!) has Ph.D.'s both in biology and theology.

This excerpt from the Preface seems to summarize the book's thesis:

"An assumption embraced by many Christians is that God revealed scientific facts in the Bible hundreds of generations before their discovery by modern science. This view of biblical inspiration asserts that the Holy Spirit dictated information about the natural world to secretary-like writers. As a result, there is purportedly a correspondence or alignment between Scripture and science. This is known as 'concordism.' Christians often claim that it is a feature of biblical inerrancy and infallibility. However, chapters 4 and 5 [of the book] review the astronomy, geology, and biology in Scripture and conclude that the science in the Bible is an ancient understanding of nature - the science-of-the-day a few thousand years ago. According to this perspective, the Holy Spirit descended to the knowledge level of the inspired authors by using their conceptualization of the physical world in order to communicate as effectively as possible inerrant and infallible Messages of Faith. This approach to biblical revelation is modeled on the greatest act of revelation - the Incarnation. God revealed Himself by descending into human flesh through Jesus, and in a similar way, the Bible uses a human understanding of the structure, operation, and origin of the world.

Chapters 6 and 7 [of the book] examine Gen[esis] 1-11 in order to determine whether concordism characterizes the relationship between the biological origins accounts and the facts of history. Like the ancient science in Scripture, it will be shown that these opening chapters include an ancient understanding of the origin of the cosmos and humanity. This ancient history is a vessel that transports inerrant and infallible foundations of the Christian faith: the universe and life were made by the God of the Bible, the creation is very good, only men and women are created in the Image of God, the Lord intended us to be in relationships with one another and in particular with Him, everyone has fallen into sin, God judges humans for their sinfulness, and He has chosen a special people through which to bless the entire world. Together, the four chapters on scriptural interpretation conclude that concordism is not a feature of Gen[esis] 1-11, and as a result there is no conflict with the modern understanding of origins offered by academic disciplines of science and history."

Some preliminary thoughts:

1. Buy or read the book!

2. Seriously. I saw Dr. Lamoureux present a lecture yesterday on evolution and intelligent design, and he is a fantastic, faith-filled speaker - with a killer moustache to boot.

3. There is nothing overly radical in Dr. Lamoureux's thesis. Virtually all Christians would deny that the Earth is flat or that the Sun revolves around the Earth, despite the several passages (e.g., Joshua 10:1-15; 1 Samuel 2:8; Job 9:6, 38:4; Psalm 19:4-6, 104:5; Isaiah 41:9; Daniel 4:11; Matthew 5:45) that could indicate otherwise.

The analogy, of course, is not perfect. Many of the references to the "ends of the earth" or the sun's rising and setting are poetic or metaphorical, not meant to be understood as "scientific" descriptions of the world. But this certainly is not always the case; one would be hard-pressed to believe that the author of Joshua, for example, wrote Joshua 10 the way he did whilebelieving that the Earth was a sphere that revolved around the Sun.

4. Of course, Genesis 1-11 are much trickier than Flat Earth theory or geocentrism, because Genesis 1-11 describes the Creation and Fall of Man - a topic of much more theological import than the shape of the Earth (cf. Romans 5-8, 1 Corinthians 15). Dr. Lamoureux promises to address these issues in his book.

5. All Scripture is God-breathed (2 Timothy 3:16). We know this much. But we do not know what exactly it means for Scripture to be "God-breathed" (i.e., inspired) means without some careful investigation and reflection. And I, for one, am excited to buckle down and investigate.

My First Post on The Ichthus' Blog

I have started writing for The Harvard Ichthus' new blog, The Fish Tank. The Ichthus is an undergraduate journal of Christian thought at Harvard College. Here is my first post there. Enjoy!

Freud, Evolutionary Psychology, and Religious Experience - An Expansion

I would like to expand on one of the points considered in the previous post, and expound upon one of my own.

As for the second point, I completely agree that most psychological theories on religion are based on the "assumption that religious belief is unjustifiable." I think this is particularly important to keep in mind, because, as far as I know, religions claim to be true. Many - if not most - Christians would not be Christians if they did not believe (for example) that Jesus rose from the dead. If such an event occurred, then there is no need for a psychological explanation for religion - religious belief is justified by fact.

7. Freud writes, "[I]t is a very striking fact that all this [religion] is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be." I find this assessment to be patently untrue. While there are some Christians who will revise the teachings of Jesus to justify their prior beliefs, most Christians feel challenged by his teachings in one way or another. I wish that my religious beliefs could justify my pride or ambition or selfishness. But they don't. They challenge me to be very different than I would otherwise be in order to obtain salvation. True, they may grant me the opportunity for an eternal world beyond this life, but I don't find that desire particularly strong to begin with. Religion is an answer to my search for truth, a truth which is radical and discomforting to my natural state, not an opiate to appease me.

Freud, Evolutionary Psychology, and Religious Experience

Just read an interesting summary of some of Freud's ideas about religious belief and experience. (I also read parts 1 and 2 of the series.) A few thoughts:

1. The distinction Beck makes between the question "Is religious belief true?" and the question "Why is there religious belief?" is very important to keep in mind. You'd be surprised by the extent to which anti-religious discourse centers on the latter and not the former.

2. Often implicit in the question "Why is there religious belief?" is some assumption that religious belief is unjustifiable. In other words, people who pose the question "Why is there religious belief?" are often really asking, "Given that religion is implausible, why is there religious belief?"

3. Freud writes, "We shall tell ourselves that it would be very nice if there were a God who created the world and was a benevolent Providence, and if there were a moral order in the universe and an after-life; but it is a very striking fact that all this is exactly as we are bound to wish it to be." (Or, as Beck puts it: "[F]or Freud, the fact that the very thing we vitally wish for is precisely the thing we believe to be the case seems a bit too coincidental.") In Freud's mind (as in the mind of many other people), potential psychological explanations for religious belief count as evidence against religion - the questions "Why is there religious belief?" and "Is religious belief true?" are somehow linked.

4. For some (hypothetical) fact to constitute evidence against religion, it must be a fact that would be incompatible with a particular religious worldview. But there is no prima facie reason to believe that God would design us not to be psychologically inclined toward religion; on the contrary, most religious people (or at least monotheists) would agree with St. Augustine's assertion in the Confessiones: "Thou [i.e., God] hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee." This is an important point to remember: For a fact to count against a certain belief, it must be incompatible with that belief. But the "facts" which Freud discusses - our natural inclination to desire that God exist - are not incompatible with most religious systems.

Of course, a non-religious account of religious belief and experience (such as Freud's) can possibly neutralize some arguments for religion that are grounded in design or experience. But it cannot neutralize religion itself.

In fact, I could construct an argument from Freud's psychological theories for the opposite metaphysical conclusion. I could "spin" the psychological evidence the other way: Given that we are psychologically inclined toward belief in God, is it not reasonable to conclude that God was somehow involved in our creation? Is it truly plausible that evolution accidentally inclined us toward belief in a fictional being completely unlike anything else in existence? Or that evolution would lead us to some philosophical abstract for our emotional consolation? (This echoes C.S. Lewis' line from Mere Christianity: "If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.")

I am not saying that this is a good argument; in fact, I would be wary of it, because I am not an evolutionary psychologist. But the point remains.

5. As Beck notes, religious belief and experience are multifaceted and powerful phenomena. It will not suffice simply to identify some experience associated with "religion" and explain that experience. Religious experience varies tremendously within and among religious traditions. Can the same evolutionary hypothesis explain Benny Hinn, Laozi, and everything in between? I doubt it.

In my opinion, the fact that this entire debate is centered around "religion" betrays a central conceit of those opposed to "religion" - a tendency to group all "religious" people together. But from a psychological perspective, this hardly seems reasonable, given how differently a Taoist and a Pentecostal will "experience" "religion."

6. None of this necessarily means I disagree with any or all of the theories proposed by evolutionary psychologists concerning religion.

Galaxies and G.K. Chesteron

In The Everlasting Man, G.K. Chesterton wrote:

Modern people...seem to forget, for instance, that a man is not even certain of the Solar System as he is certain of the South Downs. The Solar System is a deduction, and doubtless a true deduction; but the point is that it is a very vast and far-reaching deduction and therefore he forgets that it is a deduction at all and treats it as a first principle. He might discover that the whole calculation is a miscalculation; and the sun and stars and street-lamps would look exactly the same.

Recently, a rather enormous miscalculation was discovered. Harvard researchers found that our galaxy is 50% more massive than previously thought.

...As if we didn't have enough reasons to recognize Chesterton's genius already.

Some Hopefully Non-Partisan Thoughts on Abortion

(Note that I will not here attempt to demonstrate that life, or "personhood," begins at conception or at birth. Obviously, the question of when "personhood" begins is the crux of this issue - and I won't directly address it. Nor will I address at all the issue of reproductive rights. That is why I hope this is "non-partisan." All I am trying to counter is the notion that people who believe life begins before birth cannot fight for that belief in the political arena. America, as a democracy, should allow all voices to be heard.)

A lot of the abortion debate doesn't really make sense to me.

Consider this professor's take on Sarah Palin's pro-life views: "...I object strongly when anyone (and especially anyone with political power) tries to take their theology out in public, to inflict those private religious (or sexual) views on other people."

As far as I can tell, what she is saying is not, technically, that Sarah Palin's belief that life begins before birth is wrong; she never addresses or refutes any claim of that kind. Rather, she disapproves of anyone who would impose a religious view upon someone else.

The conclusion that I must draw is that Professor Doniger believes Sarah Palin and other "pro-lifers" should not attempt to ban abortion, even if they think aborting fœtuses is wrong. This conclusion is not unique; in fact, it is echoed by many who personally believe abortion to be wrong but do not wish to impose upon the will of others.

Joe Biden summarizes the reasoning well: "I'm prepared as a matter of faith to accept that life begins at the moment of conception. But that is my judgment. For me to impose that judgment on everyone else who is equally and maybe even more devout than I am seems to me is inappropriate in a pluralistic society."

I find this reasoning to be terribly flawed.

Let us assume that I am walking down the street and see a murder taking place. The person being "murdered" is actually not a person at all, but a life-size doll. I, unfortunately, am unaware of that important fact. Should I deter the alleged murderer?

If I believe I am witnessing a murder - even if there is, in fact, no murder taking place - it is not only my "right" to "impose my will" upon the murderer by stopping him; it is my responsibility. You can argue, of course, with my assertion that a murder is actually taking place - but can you argue with my duty to prevent everything I believe to be murder?

If you cannot argue with that duty, I do not see how you can argue with the duty of those who believe personhood begins before birth to fight for the "unborn" - whether or not you agree with them.

It is true that "pro-choicers" believe "pro-lifers" are imposing their views upon women - and they are - but "pro-choicers" are themselves imposing their views upon millions of fœtuses. Clearly, imposition of will is not the problem. In fact, all law can be construed as an imposition of will. After all, we regularly impose our will upon would-be murderers, rapists, and thieves, because we believe murder, rape, and thievery are wrong.

But abortion is different, many say - because opposition to abortion is religious.

That is generally (but not necessarily) true. (One counterexample is Nat Hentoff, an atheist who is very critical of abortion.)

(Of course, it was also generally true of those who opposed slavery. In the 1800's, mostly Christian abolitionists mercilessly imposed their will on slaveholders, who saw it as their fundamental right to do whatever they wanted with their property.)

However, let us assume it is necessarily true; that is, let us assume that all opposition to abortion is religious. Then, the argument is that political opposition to abortion is groundless because it is religiously based.

Nowhere in the Constitution do I see anything which prohibits the influence of religious beliefs on public policy. Obviously, there are limitations on religion's influence on public policy - but, in this instance, no one is imposing religious beliefs on anyone else. Abortion is not a religious issue, but an ethical and social issue profoundly influenced by religion; the distinction is huge. No one is forcing anyone else to go to mass or to pray to Mecca five times a day. This is a far, far cry from "respecting an establishment of religion."

The Supreme Court itself had this to say in Harris v. McRae:

"Although neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally 'pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another'...it does not follow that a statute violates the Establishment Clause because it 'happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' That the Judæo-Christian religions oppose stealing does not mean that a State or the Federal Government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, enact laws prohibiting larceny. The Hyde Amendment [an amendment banning the use of federal funds to pay for abortions], as the District Court noted, is as much a reflection of 'traditionalist' values towards abortion, as it is an embodiment of the views of any particular religion."

Supreme Court Justice David Souter, in an opinion of his concerning the First Amendment, stated that "government should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion." Most people would agree with his assessment. So let me ask this question: If government is religiously "neutral," is it fair to privilege secular opinions on abortion over religious opinions? Should Sarah Palin's opinion be excluded simply because it is founded on religious belief? Can that be reconciled with Souter's statement?

I think not.

It is anyone's right to disagree with "pro-lifers" and to vote for the expansion or protection of reproductive rights. But to demand that those opposed to abortion recuse themselves from the political discussion, as Doniger does, seems unfair to me.

An Exceptionally Simple Theory of Everything

A friend showed me this article yesterday, and I was basically stunned.

Whether or not this guy's theory is true (the LHC will hopefully be able to test it), it demonstrates a few very interesting things (and I'm not even talking about the "surfer dude" angle).

First off, it's extremely elegant - or, in its author's words, "exceptionally simple." (That might be a bit of an overstatement, unless you're conversant in Lie algebras. But the title of the theory is actually a pun, because E₈ is technically a "simple" and "exceptional" Lie group.)

In fact, elegance is the main thing it has going for it; even though some people criticize its scientific merits, a lot of people seem enamored with its beauty. One professor said, "Some incredibly beautiful stuff falls out of Lisi's theory, I think that this must be more than coincidence and he really is touching on something profound." Doesn't it sound like he's talking about a work of art instead of a scientific theory?

Paul Dirac (an atheist) said, "God used beautiful mathematics in creating the world." What he meant was that he thought the fundamental physical and mathematical laws governing our reality were rational, simple, and elegant - beautiful.

I've often noticed this mystical (and even religious) devotion scientists and mathematicians have to their respective fields, and how they expect logical and elegant solutions to their problems. They expect the Theory of Everything to make sense, and even to be mathematically perfect. Notice what Lisi says about his theory: "This is an all-or-nothing kind of theory - it's either going to be exactly right, or spectacularly wrong. I'm the first to admit this is a long shot. But it ain't over till the LHC sings."

Why is it "all-or-nothing"? Because if it's off, just by a little, even if it explains gravity, it loses its symmetry. It loses its elegance. It ceases to be beautiful - and as Dirac noted, only beautiful mathematics were used in the creation of the world.

I wonder if he ever asked why this is the case...

Exploding Pigs

Because nothing says environmental responsibility like exploding pigs...

And yes, my friend was able to get a negative life span. Which is amazing for a variety of reasons.

And yes, the TV network producing the Flash game is state-sponsored.

And yes, the game violates the network's own code of practice.

And yes, some people are angry.

And yes...I should stop starting my sentences with "And yes."

Blogroll

Some good blog posts here, here, here (and, in fact, all of the "Inerrancy" posts), and here.

Global...Cooling?

If this is at all true...God has a sense of humor.

Brain Scanners and Free Will

So apparently we don't have free will anymore.

Right? I mean, how else can you interpret the data? Your brain fires up seven seconds before you consciously make a decision! How could you possibly have any control?

Unfortunately for all the die-hard monists out there, the reality is a little more complicated.

(And yes, I know the article never explicitly states that we have no free will, but since that conclusion seems foregone to the researchers mentioned, I will contest it.)

I am also, by the way, completely ignoring the fact that the predictive quality of the brain imaging data maxed out at 60%. Does that sound conclusive?

What the experiment proves - at most - is that our subconscious triggers simple, essentially random decisions (like the ones in the article) before they are consciously made.

But let's consider an even broader scope. Let's imagine neuroscientists had proved all mental processes - decisions, thoughts, feelings - were formulated subconsciously before they were formulated consciously. What would that say about free will?

Here is the underlying logical framework:

1. Brain imaging techniques allow scientists to determine how a choice is made.
2. These imaging techniques demonstrate that some choices are made subconsciously, not consciously.
3. Therefore, the subconscious is in fact the originator of choice and, by extension, will.
4. Therefore, there is no soul, free will, etc.

I don't have any lasting problem with #1-3. The dicey conclusion is #4, which links the Freudian idea of consciousness with the theological concept of the soul and with the philosophical concept of free will.

Who first linked these together? Descartes. In fact, the idea that the conscious is in fact a spiritual or non-material manifestation of the soul which controls the corporeal body is the main tenet of what is called (appropriately) Cartesian dualism.

Cartesian dualism, as you might expect, has come under severe criticism in modern times, especially from the field of neuroscience. In fact, to the modern educated layperson, Descartes' belief (derided as the "Ghost in the Machine") that the mind controlled the body can seem nonsensical.

I am not here to defend Cartesian dualism (nor do I subscribe to it). I am here, however, to point out what I think is a rather obvious but ignored fact: Descartes's dualism is not the only dualism.

Consider again claim #3, that the subconscious, not the conscious, chooses. Fine - but do we know anything about why the subconscious chose what it chose? Does the article say anything about why some people choose left and some people choose right? No.

So perhaps our free will allowed our subconscious to choose rather than our conscious. That is not too complicated an idea to consider - and yet no one seems to have considered it.

I wish they would.

Smerdyakov's Question

"God created light on the first day, and the sun, moon, and stars on the fourth day. Where did the light come from on the first day?"

- Smerdyakov, The Brothers Karamazov

Convenient that Moses predicted the Big Bang, isn't it?

"Fiat lux." (Genesis 1:3, Vul.)

From the Mouths of Babes

It's not even that I agree with this article (which I don't...completely). It's just priceless - especially the comments.